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Recent surveys report that ﬁrms claim they do not rely heavily on patents in order to
appropriate a return on their innovation. Yet, ﬁrms do patent, as indicated by the large
number of patents that are granted. This paper oﬀers a possible resolution to this puzzle.
It takes a simpliﬁed version of a duopoly innovation race, and studies the patenting deci-
sion of an innovator who has private information about the improvability of her innovation.
In this setting, it is shown that a ﬁrm may use the patenting decision to mislead her rival.
Under symmetric information, research can be stimulated but not disclosed. However, under
asymmetric information, disclosure is more likely even though the incentive to do research
may be weakened.
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mine.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Surveys show that ﬁrms claim not to rely heavily on patents to (directly) appropriate the returns
from their innovation (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000). However, ﬁrms do patent, and we have
witnessed an unprecedented jump in U.S. and Canadian patenting in 1998. This can be explained
by the important reforms in the U.S. and the Canadian patent systems (Gallini 2002, Gallini,
Putnam and Tepperman 2001).1 However, there may be other reasons, as well. It may be that
ﬁrms not only desire to appropriate the return on their innovation directly (for instance, by
collecting royalties from ﬁr m su s i n gt h em o r ee ﬃcient invention), but use patents in other ways,
for the same purpose.
More often than not, legal counsel provided to ﬁrms concerned with their Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (IPRs) is to “patent their innovations ASAP, as soon as possible.” The underlying
reason is that “competitors are working on the same idea, and thus whoever ﬁles an applica-
tion ﬁrst has major advantages over others who ﬁle later.”2 A natural counter argument to this
simplistic line of thinking is that given that her innovation can be improved upon, an innovator
may prefer to avoid the disclosure of information that follows a patent in order to keep her
competitive advantage. Indeed, ﬁrms typically want to keep most inventions secret during the
course of their development. Hence, the “ASAP” advice appears not to be always useful. A
natural question that arises in this context is the following: when does an innovator patent her
discovery immediately and when does she keep it secret whilst improving upon it?
The decision to wait and the decision to patent have each their own drawbacks. On the
one hand, even though a patent gives temporary monopoly power to the innovator, it discloses
information, and therefore facilitates rapid catch up by competitors. Moreover, if the innovation
can be improved upon, the patent allows competitors to do so without undertaking all of the
research already completed by the innovator. All ﬁrms are then placed on an equal footing from
where they may improve upon the innovation, an improvement that may eventually invalidate
1U.S. patent protection has (i) extended patent protection to new subject matter (starting with the Diamonds
v. Chakrabarty case, 1980); (ii) given greater power to patentholders in infringement lawsuits (creation of a
specialized court); (iii) lengthened the term of patents (now 20 years).
2Advice given by P. Kelly, in the book by Lechter (1995), page 226.
2the original patented innovation. On the other hand, the decision to wait entails risk; even if
it slows down competitors, it is possible that one of them may discover the yet non-patented
innovation and decide either to exploit it or to patent it himself. If the system in force is “ﬁrst-
to-invent,” as is the case in the U.S., the patentholder can claim that she invented the innovation
ﬁrst, and then claim the right to share in its exploitation. However, in Canada and many other
countries, the ﬁrst innovator cannot even claim that she was the ﬁrst inventor (“ﬁrst-to-ﬁle”
rule). Therefore, the decision to patent an improvable innovation must be challenged against
the decision to keep it secret.
Another issue of great importance is the following: what if there is asymmetric information on
whether the innovation can be improved upon. For instance, if the leader has more information
concerning the innovation than her competitor (e.g., whether it can be improved or not), she
may use this information strategically. The less-informed ﬁr mc a nt h e nt r yt oi n f e ri n f o r m a t i o n
from observing the leader’s decision. Thus, the patenting (or waiting) decision can be potentially
used by the leader as a strategy to mislead her competitors.
There is considerable evidence that ﬁrms use “decoy patents” to direct competitors into
unproﬁtable ﬁelds of research: “An oﬀensive protection (bluﬀ) is part of the game; for instance
decoy patents are common in order to mislead competitors and make them believe that we
are doing research in an unexpected area” (translation of a quotation in L’entreprise (October
1995), C. Pascaud and J.L. Piotraut, Industrial Innovation).3 In the petroleum industry, it is
common practice to patent numerous inventions, one good one in a ﬂood of bad inventions.4
In spite of these glaring examples from the real world, little theoretical attention has been
3It is very diﬃcult to empirically distinguish the practice of patenting numerous misleading inventions from
“drilling a lot of dry holes” to increase the probability of ﬁnding a valuable invention.
4The pharmaceutical industry has appealing examples of the strategic use of information. For instance, in the
mid 1980s, Genentech and Ely Lilly were working on the same project for the pharmaceutical human Growth
Hormone (hGH) to treat children with a deﬁciency of that hormone. During the time Genentech was improving
this hormone (a version with one less amino acid, afterwards called met-less hGH), they chose not to patent and
disclose information, thereby keeping their competitive advantage. Subsequently they behaved strategically: they
published four or ﬁve ways of accomplishing the same engineering task, without divulging the most eﬃcient and
actually used ones. After that, they made a mistake, patenting one part of the improvement too early; thus, Ely
Lilly caught up with them and was allowed protection for a better improvement (See McKelvey 1996).
3devoted to the study of patents as means to mislead competitors (Horstmann, MacDonald and
Slivinsky 1985, Crampes and Langinier 1998). There is however a burgeoning empirical literature
concerned with the strategic management of patent portfolios (Hall and Ham-Ziedonis 2001).
Even though few contributions deal with the use of patents to mislead competitors, patents have
been extensively studied in the economic literature as the patenting decision has a non-trivial
impact on the pace of innovation.5
The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple theoretical framework within which a ﬁrm’s
decision to patent or wait can be meaningfully explored. We consider innovations that can or
cannot be improved, under both symmetric and asymmetric information on whether, indeed,
the innovation can be improved upon. Our paper focuses primarily on the private incentives to
patent. We study how strategic patenting decisions can, under certain circumstances, induce
the competitor to exit the race. The model is closest in spirit to Horstmann, MacDonald and
Slivinsky (1985), in which an innovator has private information about the proﬁt available to
competitors. In their setting, the patent system can transmit private information from the
innovator to competitors, and, patenting an innovation may signal that the invention is easy to
duplicate. They show that patenting occurs less often as it becomes a more reliable signal of the
proﬁtability of the imitation. In our model, on the contrary, the patenting decision may signal
that the innovation cannot be improved upon.
We consider a simpliﬁed version of a duopoly patent race, where the date on which a discovery
occurs is known, but the identity of the one who makes it is uncertain. At the outset, the leader
has discovered an innovation, and is to decide either to patent the innovation or to keep it secret
while attempting to improve on it. We assume that the follower knows that an innovation has
5The government’s choice on whether or not to grant patents on every improvement will change the pace
of innovation as will the system considered, namely “ﬁrst-to-ﬁl e ”v e r s u s“ ﬁrst-to-invent” (Scotchmer and Green
1990). Takalo and Kanniainen (2000) argue that patents slow technological progress, and they consider that the
initial investment in R&D only leads to a future option. The idea of option originated with Pakes (1986) who
states that the renewal of a patent gives the option to keep it in force the following year. They show that the
patenting decision may be postponed if the project is not too diﬃcult, if the coverage of the patent protection is
small and if the cost of the patent is relatively high. The cumulative nature of innovation has also been analyzed
(O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse 1996, Chang 1995, O’Donoghue 1998), as well as the problems linked to the
patentability of improvements (van Dijk 1996) or applications (Matutes, Regibeau and Rockett 1996).
4been discovered. He observes the decision of the leader, and then has to decide to stay in the race
or to exit. The races diﬀer depending on whether or not the leader has patented her innovation.
If she has patented, then both ﬁrms attempt to improve upon the existing innovation. However,
because of the patent, the follower is prevented from exploiting the innovation, while the leader
c a n .W ep o s i tt h a ti ti sn o ts u ﬃcient to simply be aware of the details (i.e., the blueprints) of
the innovation in order to improve on it. Rather, developing the innovation may require some
speciﬁc skills or know-how that are costly to acquire.6 On the other hand, if the leader has kept
her innovation secret, the follower would have to ﬁrst catch up with the leader, and if successful,
try to improve on it.
However, this is only one side of the story. Indeed, all innovations do not constitute promising
research leads, and it may turn out that the innovation is non-improvable. Ex ante,t h el e a d e r
is the only party that is truly aware of whether or not this is the case, as it was her discovery to
begin with. Nevertheless, new skills may have been acquired in the process of discovery which
may ﬁnd applications in new research programs. We assume that even when the innovation
cannot be improved upon, the leader invests in another research program. If the leader has
patented the innovation, it is costly for the follower to acquire the technical details behind it.7
On the other hand, if the leader has suppressed her innovation, the follower must ﬁrst catch
up with her before he can realize that the innovation cannot be improved and start another
research program.
Our main results are as follows: under symmetric information, the leader discloses her in-
novation less often when it can be improved upon; but the research is stimulated (even though
it is a duplication of the ﬁrst innovation’s research eﬀort), as the follower stays in the race
more often. Things are quite diﬀerent when the leader has more information concerning the
improvability of the innovation than the follower. This latter has only prior beliefs, and the
leader behaves strategically in order to mislead her competitor. For a certain constellation of
6Choi (2001) considers a problem of licensing in which he notices that in practice, information is costly to
transfer to other ﬁrms in the case of licensing. In the same vein, we consider that information is costly to acquire
when a patent has been granted.
7That is, the process of realizing that an innovation cannot be improved upon may be prohibitively costly.
The follower can start another research program, but it may prove more diﬃcult to make it proﬁtable.
5parameters she suppresses her innovation under symmetric information whereas she patents it
under asymmetric information (only if the follower has low prior beliefs about its improvability);
she randomizes her decision when his prior beliefs are higher. Therefore, under asymmetric in-
formation, disclosure and patenting are more likely than under symmetric information, but the
research intensity may be lower since the follower exits more often. When the follower observes
that the innovation has been kept secret, it informs him that the innovation can be improved
upon, while the observation of a patent gives no information. Thus, the leader may expect the
follower to stay in the race when the innovation cannot be improved upon, leading the follower
to pursue an unproﬁtable research avenue. This kind of patent can be seen as a decoy.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2, and the
payoﬀso ft h eﬁrms are computed. In Section 3 we determine the decision to patent and the
decision to stay under symmetric information. We go on to analyze the case of asymmetric
information and derive equilibria in pure and mixed strategies in Section 4. Section 5 presents
results from a comparative statics analysis while Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a two-ﬁrm model of product innovation and improvement where the innovation
must be completed before starting the improvement phase. At the outset, ﬁrm A (the leader)
has made the innovation, whereas ﬁrm B (the follower) has not but is fully aware that the
leader has made it. Having done the innovation, ﬁrm A has private information concerning
its improvability,9 whereas ﬁrm B has only prior beliefs about it. For simplicity, we consider
only the two polar cases, one where the innovation can (cannot) be improved. The innovation
cannot be improved upon if, for instance, it is prohibitively costly to do so. Hence, there are
only two states of nature, Ω = {h,l},w h e r eh corresponds to an improvable innovation and l to
a non-improvable innovation. Let ρ denote the probability that the innovation can be improved.
8The idea of a decoy is closely related to a model of feint developed by Hendricks and McAfee (2003). In a
game of feint the leader, who can be of two types (e.g., good or bad), wants to convince the follower that she is
the opposite type thereby misleading her competitor.
9“Having done the original work, the inventor is likely to be better positioned than everyone else to see certain
of the developmental opportunities and the solutions,” Merges and Nelson (1994).
6The timing of the game is as follows.
First, the leader has to decide either to patent her innovation (p), or to keep it secret
(s); dA : Ω → SA = {p,s} where di is the decision of ﬁrm i = A,B and Si the set of strategies.
In any case, she keeps investing in research, either to improve upon her innovation or to make
a new discovery.
Second, the follower observes the decision of the leader and then decides whether or not to
continue investing in research, i.e., stay in the race or exit, dB : SA → SB = {stay,exit}.
If the leader has patented her innovation, the innovation becomes partly available because of
the obligatory public disclosure of any patent. It is only partly available because the follower
will have to acquire know-how (materials plants, for instance) or, more generally, the knowledge
that is not included in the patent description, to be completely aware of the innovation.10 If
the follower decides to stay in the race, he has to pay a ﬁxed cost, F, to acquire this non-
revealed information. After incurring this cost, he becomes fully aware of the improvability
of the innovation. In other words, only after F is sunk does the follower learn whether the
innovation is improvable or not. If the innovation has been kept secret, and if the follower
decides to stay in the race, he must ﬁrst catch up with the leader (i.e., discover the innovation)
and then, if possible, try to improve upon it.
We assume that once both ﬁrms have made their decisions, and whenever ﬁrm B stays in
the race, they are engaged in a (simpliﬁed) race where each ﬁrm spends c per unit of time.11 It
is either an asymmetric race,w h e r eﬁrm B searches for the innovation whilst ﬁrm A tries to
improve upon it, if possible (when the innovation has been kept secret), or it is a symmetric
race if they both try to improve upon the innovation. The latter case obtains either when ﬁrm
A has patented the innovation, or when she has kept it secret, but ﬁrm B has caught up with
her. If ﬁrm B catches up with ﬁrm A, he may choose to patent his discovery (dB/s = p). If
10In other words, a patent description does not give complete knowledge of the technology (e.g., the background
knowledge that researchers accumulate with their research is also important). The leader may even decide to
license the know-how.
11We make the simplistic assumption that decisions and investments are not made at the same time. For
instance, it could be the case that the R&D specialists of the ﬁrm decide whether to patent or not, and then
decide to invest starting when the budget becomes available.
7he decides not to patent it, ﬁrm A could conceivably decide to patent it later and the strategy
to suppress can then be seen as a delay strategy. For simplicity, we set the parameters of the
model such that if the leader does not patent in the ﬁrst place, she does not patent afterwards.
In this simpliﬁed model of race, there is no uncertainty about the date at which a discovery
occurs (either the innovation or the improvement), and we abstract from research eﬀort decisions.
Let t1 denote the ﬁrst date at which a discovery occurs, either in the asymmetric race when
the innovation has been kept secret (dA = s), or in the symmetric race when the innovation
has been patented (dA = p). Furthermore, if dA = s and the follower has caught up with the
leader at date t1 we need to specify another date, say t2, on which the improvement or a new
discovery will occur. In these simple races, even though the dates are known with certainty, the
identity of the winner (of either race) is not. With probability p1 ∈ [0,1], the leader makes the
discovery ﬁr s t ,a n dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y(1 − p1) it is the follower. If the innovation has been kept
secret and the follower discovers it, both ﬁrms are engaged in a symmetric improvement race (or
a new innovation race if the innovation cannot be improved upon). Then, with probability p2 ∈
[1/2,1], the leader makes the improvement (or new discovery) ﬁr s t ,a n dw i t ht h ec o m p l e m e n t a r y
probability, the follower is ﬁrst. The restriction on p2 (i.e., p2 ≥ 1/2) gives the leader a little
advantage in the second race, and insures that if she has not patented ﬁrst, she will not patent
afterwards.12
To complete the description of the model, we make the following assumptions. The patent
system is assumed to be “ﬁrst-to-ﬁle:” the ﬁrst to apply for the patent and not necessarily the ﬁrst
12In a more complex patent race, each ﬁrm should choose his or her own intensity of research (variable c that
is ﬁxed here). A more realistic (but more complicated and not necessarily tractable) model should consider two
features both of which are well emphasized in the patent race literature. See Reignanum (1989) for a survey on
patent races. First, neither ﬁrm knows when the innovation will occur; this is modeled by a random discovery
date that depends on both ﬁrms’ level of investments. Second, neither ﬁrm knows who will make the discovery
ﬁrst. These research intensities should inﬂuence the date at which both the innovation and improvement will
be discovered, as well as the identity of the winner. None of these eﬀects are at stake here, as the intensity of
research is ﬁxed. See end of Section 5 for details on these complex patent races.
8to innovate gets the patent.13 The patent on the innovation guarantees a perfect monopoly,14
the pursuant discovery of the improvement invalidates the innovation, and the patent life is
inﬁnite.
Firm A has an innovation.





- or keep it secret.
Firm B observes A’s decision
(not the improvability).
He decides to
- stay in the race,
- or exit the race.
They both spend c 
per unit of time.
At t1, one firm makes 
a discovery.
-With probability p1 it is A:
end of the game.
-With probability (1- p1) it is B;
- if patent: end of the game;
- if secret: B can either patent 
or not. In any case: improvement 
(or new discovery) race. 
At t2, one firm  makes
a discovery.
-With probability p2, it is A: 
end of the game.
-With probability (1- p2) it 
is B: end of the game. 
Decision stage Race stage
Timing of the game
To summarize, the timing of the game is as follows. There are two stages: a decision stage
and ar a c es t a g e . In the decision stage, the leader ﬁrst decides either to patent her innovation
or not (i.e., dA ∈ SA). Second, the follower observes her decision, and then decides either to stay
i nt h er a c eo rt oe x i t( i . e . ,dB ∈ SB). Whatever his decision, the leader always invests to improve
or to make a new innovation. If dB = exit, the leader is assured of making the improvement
or ﬁnding a new innovation. However, if dB = stay, ﬁrms are engaged in a symmetric race if
dA = p,o ri na na s y m m e t r i cr a c ei fdA = s.I na n yc a s e ,ﬁrms spend c per unit of time, and at
date t1, either the leader makes the discovery (with probability p1) and then the game ends, or
the follower does (with the complementary probability) and, depending on the race, the game
13In the “ﬁrst-to-invent” system, as long as the initial inventor can prove that she made the invention ﬁrst, she
can exploit her innovation, even if patented by someone else. In this paper we consider the more dramatic case
where the ﬁrst innovator cannot even claim the exploitation.
14For both innovation and improvement, we assume that the patent coverage is perfect and that imitation is
not possible. This is a traditional assumption in the patent literature, although it is well known that the patent
protection is imperfect. See Aoki and Hu (1999) and Crampes and Langinier (2002) for an analysis with imperfect
patent protection.
9does not necessarily end. If dA = p, this is the end of the game. Otherwise, if dA = s,a n dt h e
follower has caught up with the leader, both ﬁrms compete to make the possible improvement.
However, the follower is to decide whether to patent or not his discovery (dB/s ∈ SA).
In the rest of the section and before solving the game in Sections 3 and 4, we detail the
payoﬀso ft h eﬁrms when the innovation is improvable and when it is not.
2.1 Payoﬀs in the Case of an Improvable Innovation
We ﬁrst determine the payoﬀso ft h et w oﬁr m sw h e nt h ei n n o v a t i o nc a nb ei m p r o v e du p o n .
If the leader patents her innovation (dA(h)=p)s h eo b t a i n saﬂow of payoﬀ Π1 in each time
period during the improvement phase. As soon as one of the ﬁrms discovers and patents the
improvement, it invalidates the patented innovation and the ﬁrm who makes the improvement
will get a ﬂow of payoﬀ Π2 during an inﬁnite period of time. On the other hand, if the leader
keeps her innovation secret (dA(h)=s), she does not exploit it during the improvement phase,
and thus she earns no return from the product innovation. It is clear that if she decides to exploit
her innovation while it is not protected by a patent, it would be equivalent to having disclosed the
information about the innovation without enjoying any temporary monopoly power. Therefore,
the follower would easily catch up because of reverse engineering, and the leader would lose the
beneﬁt of being ahead. She is thus better oﬀ not exploiting it while it is kept secret. Nevertheless,
even though she does not get any payoﬀ during the improvement phase, if she makes the discovery
ﬁrst (i.e., the improvement), she gets a ﬂow of payoﬀ Π12 during an inﬁnite period of time for
patenting the improved innovation. However, if the follower catches up with her and makes the
innovation (he is ﬁrst in the race), she still has a chance to make the improvement as both ﬁrms
compete for the improvement.
We make the plausible assumption that the original innovation has little value compared to
any patented improvement. In other words, the original patent contributes little value compared
to the improvement.15 Formally, Π1 < min(Π2,Π12).
15This is, for instance, the case with gene patents that have very little value by themselves, but lead to highly
valuable improvements. It can also be the case with laser technology that is tied to the value of follow-on
applications (for other examples, see Green and Scotchmer 1995).
10Most of our discussion of the patenting decision will be a function of Π12 and Π2 and we do
not specify ap r i o r iany relationship between those payoﬀs. At ﬁrst, it is tempting to think that
the (discounted) sum of the payoﬀs from patenting the innovation (Π1)a n dt h ei m p r o v e m e n t
(Π2) would equal the payoﬀ from patenting the improved innovation (Π12). However, this is
not necessarily the case. Indeed, it can happen that the introduction of the innovation boosts
the demand for the improvement and therefore Π12 < Π2 (e.g., when consumers ﬁrst get used
to the innovation before buying the improvement. For instance, one might think of a buy-back
guarantee where the ﬁr mi sa s s u r e dt oh a v eac a p t i v eb a s eo fc o n s u m e r s ) .O r ,i tc a nb et h ec a s e
that the introduction of the innovation is at too premature a stage in the process, and does not
do well in the subsequent improvement, and thus Π12 > Π2 (or for instance, due to the cost
duplication of launching, or advertising the innovation and the improvement, it is worthwhile to
wait for launching a unique improved innovation). In short, Π12 can be bigger, equal or smaller
than Π2.
After having deﬁned the diﬀerent payoﬀ ﬂows, we now determine the (expected discounted)
payoﬀso fe a c hﬁrm depending on the initial decisions made. If the follower exits the race, his











[δ1(Π1 − c)+Π2(1 − δ1)]
if she patents the innovation, and V m
s = 1
r[−cδ1 + Π12(1 − δ1)] if she keeps it secret; where
δ1 ≡ 1 − e−rt1 when the discovery is made at date t1, r is the discount rate, the superscript
m stands for monopoly and the subscript p (respectively s) stands for patent (respectively for
secret).










[−cδ1 +( 1− p1)Π2(1 − δ1)] − F for ﬁrm B,
where p1 (respectively 1 − p1) is the probability that ﬁrm A (respectively ﬁrm B)m a k e st h e
discovery ﬁrst and F is the ﬁxed cost that the follower must pay in order to achieve the level
11of technology of ﬁrm A.16 While the follower can conceivably enter the second stage of the race
without pursuing any research, he is prevented from exploiting the innovation.
The payoﬀst ob o t hﬁrms when dA(h)=s are more complicated. In this setting, the winner
of the asymmetric race is either the leader who makes the improvement, or the follower who
makes the innovation. If the follower wins, the improvement has not been made yet, and then
both ﬁrms are competing to be ﬁrst to discover it and thus they are engaged in a new race.





[−cδ1 + p1Π12(1 − δ1)+( 1− p1)rV A





[−cδ1 +( 1− p1)rV B
2 ] for ﬁrm B,
where V i
2 for i = A,B is the payoﬀ of ﬁrm i once ﬁrm B has made the innovation. To deﬁne V i
2
precisely we need to consider the new decision of the follower: to patent the innovation or not
(dB/s ∈ {p,s}). Recall that the considered patent system is “ﬁrst-to-ﬁle,” and thus the follower
can enjoy a patent protection on the innovation, as he is ﬁrst to ﬁle a patent application.17 If
he decides not to patent it, the leader does not either as p2 ≥ 1/2.T h e r e f o r e ,V A







r[−c(δ2 − δ1)+p2Π2(1 − δ2)] if ﬁrm B patents after catching up with ﬁrm A
1
r[−c(δ2 − δ1)+p2Π12(1 − δ2)] if ﬁrm B does not
(1)
where p2 represents the probability that ﬁrm A makes the discovery, δ2 =1− e−rt2, as the





max{(Π1 − c)(δ2 − δ1)+( 1− p2)Π2(1 − δ2),−c(δ2 − δ1)+( 1− p2)Π12(1 − δ2)},
where the ﬁrst term in the bracket represents his payoﬀ if dB/s = p and the second term if
dB/s = s. A comparison of these two payoﬀs allows to determine whether or not the follower
should patent. As we will see in the next section, for certain constellations of the parameters, the
follower prefers to patent. We now deﬁne the payoﬀs when the innovation cannot be improved
upon.
16Alternatively, one can imagine that ﬁrm B must discover the innovation by himself, and F is only an entry




r[−cδ1 +( 1− p)V
B
2 (1 − δ1)] − F,w h e r e
V
B
2 is the discounted expected proﬁto fﬁrm B once he has caught up with A and is precisely deﬁned later.
17In the “ﬁrst-to-invent” patent system, he would share the payoﬀ with ﬁrm A,a sﬁrm A was the ﬁrst innovator.
122.2 Payoﬀs in the Case of a Non-Improvable Innovation
Next, we consider a case where the innovation can have a positive value itself (i.e., Π1 >
0) but cannot be improved (because, for instance, it is prohibitively costly to do so, or the
improvement is not worthwhile). The leader continues her research program, but this time it is
not for improving the innovation. To keep the model simple, we assume that the new innovation
generates the same ﬂow of payoﬀ Π1.
If the leader patents her non-improvable innovation (dA(l)=p), the follower must spend a
ﬁxed research cost in order to acquire the technology before trying to improve upon it. However,
after spending this ﬁxed cost, he learns that the innovation cannot be improved. At this point,
he must decide whether to stay in the race or not; that is, whether to start a new project or not.
The new innovation might use a portion of the previous production facilities; thus, the follower
could decide to enter the race in order to recoup some of his ﬁxed costs, and to costlessly explore
other ﬁelds of research.18
If the leader decides to keep her innovation secret (dA(l)=s), the follower can pursue
his research. If he makes the innovation eventually, he learns that the innovation cannot be
successfully improved. He then has to decide whether or not to exploit this innovation, and
continue the race to discover a new innovation.














[Π1 − cδ1 + Π1(1 − δ1)]
if she patents, and Rm
s = 1
r[−cδ1 + Π1(1 − δ1)] if she keeps the innovation secret. Here, the
second innovation does not invalidate the ﬁrst one, and therefore, the patentholder can enjoy










[−cδ1 +( 1− p1)Π1(1 − δ1)] − F,f o rﬁrm B.
If dA(l)=s,e i t h e rﬁrm can win the race. If the leader is the winner, she has a new innovation
and the game is over. If the winner is the follower, he has only discovered the initial innovation,
18The ﬁxed cost is sunk at the time the discovery is made, but not at the time the decision is made to stay in
the race or not.
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[Π1(1 − δ1) − c(δ2 − δ1)+( 1− p2)Π1(1 − δ2)]
where p2 represents the probability of ﬁrm A making the discovery and δ2 =1− e−rt2.I nt h e
case of a non-improvable innovation, on the equilibrium path, the follower always patents after
catching up with the leader. As this is a dominant strategy for the follower ( dB/s = p), we just
write the equilibrium payoﬀ.
Before solving the game under both symmetric and asymmetric information, we formally
state restrictions on parameters. As we are mainly interested in the decision stage, we restrict
the values of the parameters such that the gross payoﬀs are non-negative. If it was not the case,
ﬁrms would just not participate in the races. Furthermore, we also put restrictions on the entry
cost F paid by the follower: this cost is assumed to be such that V B
p > 0 >R B
p .T h ee n t r yc o s t
does not allow the follower to make a positive proﬁt when the innovation cannot be improved
upon. These restrictions are summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 The gross payoﬀs are non-negative if
Π2 >K ,Π12 > Π1,





where K ≡ (cδ1 + rF)/(1 − p1)(1 − δ1).
The formal proof of this lemma is given in the appendix. We impose lower bounds on Π2
and Π12 to make sure that the gross payoﬀs are positive and that the ﬁrms continue to search.
In the rest of the paper we consider that the inequalities in (2) are always satisﬁed.
143 Symmetric Information
As a benchmark, we consider the case of symmetric information in which both ﬁrms know
whether the innovation can be improved or not. We analyze ﬁrst the improvable innovation
(Ω = h). To determine the Nash perfect equilibrium of the game, we solve the game backward;
(a) we start with the very last decision of the follower (that actually does not appear in the
decision stage, but later in the game) when the innovation has been kept secret and the follower
h a sc a u g h tu pw i t ht h el e a d e r ,( dB/s ∈ {p,s}); (b) then, in the decision stage, we study the
decision of the follower to stay or not (dB ∈ SB); (c) and ﬁnally we consider the patenting
decision of the leader (dA ∈ SA). We now solve the game.
(a) If Ω = h, dA(h)=s, and the follower has caught up, he keeps it secret (dB/s = s)i fh eg e t s
ah i g h e rp r o ﬁt from doing so. The comparison of the payoﬀs is given in the appendix and
we obtain that the follower chooses dB/s = s if
Π2 < Π12 −
(δ2 − δ1)Π1
(1 − δ2)(1 − p2)
. (3)
Even though this last decision is made during the race stage, it has not to be omitted in
order to have a complete speciﬁcation of the equilibrium. This decision will not be altered
by the information structure. Indeed, under asymmetric information it will be made while
the follower has learnt whether the innovation is improvable. It is why this decision does
not explicitly appear in the decision stage of the game.
(b) Now we turn to the decision of the follower to stay in the race or to exit (dB ∈ SB). Whatever
t h es t r a t e g yc h o s e nb yt h el e a d e r ,dB(·)=stay as V B
s > 0 and V B
p > 0 if Lemma 1 is
satisﬁed.
(c) Anticipating that the follower stays no matter what strategy she chooses, the leader’s decision
is dA(h)=s if V A
s (payoﬀ from keeping the innovation secret) is greater than V A
p (payoﬀ
from patenting it). We can rewrite V A
s >VA
p as
Π2 < Π12 +




where the value of V A
2 depends on the equilibrium path after the follower has caught up
with the leader (as deﬁned in (a)) and is deﬁned by one of the equations (1).
15Our ﬁrst proposition follows:
Proposition 1 (Improvable innovation) If the innovation can be improved upon and the in-
equality (4) is satisﬁed, there exists a unique Nash perfect equilibrium such that (i) the
leader decides to keep her innovation secret and (ii) the follower always stays in the race.
If he catches up with the leader, he keeps it secret as long as (3) is satisﬁed; otherwise he
patents it.
The proof of this proposition is partially given above, and partially in the appendix. All of
the remaining proofs are given in the appendix.
If the inequality (4) is not satisﬁed, there exists a Nash perfect equilibrium such that the
innovator always patents and the follower stays in the race. When the ﬂow of payoﬀ generated
only by the improvement (Π2) is bigger than the ﬂow of payoﬀ from the improved innovation
(Π12), the leader unambiguously patents her innovation, as the added value of the improvement
created by the introduction of the innovation is worthwhile. At the other extreme, for values of
Π2 << Π12, the leader keeps her innovation secret, as the introduction of the innovation is not
proﬁtable to the improvement. Those two sets of results are intuitive. However, when both Π2
and Π12 are large and close enough, the leader prefers to keep her innovation secret (even though
we may have Π2 > Π12). Hence, the leader may prefer to keep her competitive advantage in the
race by not disclosing information through a patent.
We represent this result in a graph (Π12,Π2) ,w h e r ew ep l o tt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo ft h e
inequalities (3) and (4). We also represent the lower bounds deﬁn e di n( 2 ) .
Insert Figure 1
We ﬁxt h ev a l u eo fΠ2 and increase Π12.A tp o i n tX the decisions of the ﬁrms are dA(h)=p
and dB(p)=stay.A sΠ12 increases, we reach an area where dA(h)=s and dB(s)=stay, but
the follower patents as soon he catches up with the leader, i.e., dB/s = p (point Y ). Then, if
Π12 increases again, the follower chooses dB/s = s (point Z).
Hence, if the payoﬀ from waiting is worthwhile, the leader prefers to keep her competitive
advantage and patent the improvement that gives higher payoﬀ. The risk is that the follower
16catches up with her (with probability 1 − p1) and makes the improvement with probability
(1 − p2) before her.
Therefore, under symmetric information, the leader decides to keep her innovation secret for
two reasons: ﬁrst, to maintain her competitive advantage of being ahead, and second, because
the return to waiting is greater than the return to immediately patenting. The former case arises
when Π12 is small compared to Π2, whereas the latter arises when Π12 is large compared to Π2.
In the case of a non-improvable innovation, the resolution is similar. It is a dominant strategy
for the follower to always patent if he catches up while the innovation has been kept secret. We
then determine the best response of the follower for any decision of the leader. As Π1 <K ,
ﬁrm B does not stay if the leader patents the innovation, but stays otherwise. The leader
anticipates correctly what the follower will do, and then decides to always patent, as Rm
p >R A
s .
We summarize this second set of results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Non-improvable innovation) If the innovation cannot be improved upon, there
exists a unique Nash perfect equilibrium such that (i) the leader decides to patent her
innovation, and (ii) the follower does not stay in the race.
This result is straightforward, as an innovation that needs not be kept secret (because it
cannot be improved upon and does not generate any future payoﬀ) will be patented, and it is
not worthwhile for the follower to stay in the race.
4A s y m m e t r i c I n f o r m a t i o n
We now consider the case in which the follower does not know whether the innovation can be
improved upon or not. We use the concept of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium to solve this game.
As we introduce asymmetric information, we explicitly specify prior beliefs for the follower;
before making his decision, with probability ρ the follower believes that the innovation can be
improved and with probability (1 − ρ) he believes that it cannot. In fact, he will only be aware
of the improvability of the innovation after having made the innovation himself. However, after
observing the strategy of the leader, the follower can update his beliefs according to Bayes’ rule.
17We ﬁr s ti n v e s t i g a t ew h e t h e raseparating equilibrium exists in which the leader patents
the non-improvable innovation, and keeps secret the improvable innovation. Then, the mere
observation of the patent informs the follower that the innovation cannot be improved upon.
Therefore, his updated beliefs are such that the probability of having an improvable innovation
when the leader keeps her innovation secret is one, whereas it is zero if it is patented. In other
words, the strategy of the leader completely reveals her private information. This equilibrium
exists so long as V m
p <VA
s ,t h a tw ec a nr e w r i t ea s
Π2 <p 1Π12 +




where the payoﬀ V A
2 is deﬁned on the equilibrium path by (1). We can state our ﬁrst result
under asymmetric information:
Proposition 3 (Separating equilibrium) If (5) is satisﬁed, there exists a Perfect Bayesian equi-
librium such that (i) the leader always keeps the innovation secret if it can be improved,
but patents it otherwise; and (ii) the follower decides not to stay after a decision to patent,
and stays after a decision to keep secret. In the latter case, if the follower catches up with
the leader, he keeps the innovation secret as long as (3) is satisﬁed; otherwise he patents.
This result is consistent with the result obtained under symmetric information. If Π12 is
much bigger than Π2 ((5) is satisﬁed), the leader has no incentive to patent an improvable
innovation. Hence, the decision to suppress signals with no ambiguity to the follower that the
innovation can be improved upon. On the contrary, the patenting decision signals that the
innovation cannot be improved.
This result no longer holds if the inequality (5) is not satisﬁed. Indeed, the leader will
deviate from the equilibrium path as she can get a higher payoﬀ if she patents the improvable
innovation. We thus ﬁnd diﬀerent equilibria whenever the inequality (5) does not hold.
We ﬁrst investigate whether a pooling equilibrium exists in which the leader patents
regardless of whether the innovation can be improved or not. In this case, the updated beliefs
of the follower remain equal to his prior beliefs, as he cannot infer anything from observing of
the decision of the leader. In order to characterize this equilibrium, we deﬁne the value of the
18prior belief that makes the follower indiﬀerent between staying and not, namely
ρ∗ ≡
rF + cδ1 − Π1(1 − p1)(1 − δ1)
(Π2 − Π1)(1 − δ1)(1 − p1)
. (6)
Depending on whether the value of the prior belief is larger or smaller than ρ∗, we characterize
two diﬀerent equilibria: one in pure strategies (the pooling equilibrium deﬁned above) and
one in mixed strategies (a hybrid equilibrium in which the leader randomizes her decision).
We state our ﬁndings in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 If condition (4) is satisﬁed and (5) is not,
1. and ρ<ρ ∗, there exists a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which (i) the leader always
patents her innovation and (ii) the follower exits the race for any out-of-equilibrium
beliefs µ (pooling equilibrium);
2. and ρ ≥ ρ∗, there exists a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which (i) the leader ran-
domizes her patenting decision when the innovation can be improved, while she always
patents it when it cannot be improved; and (ii) the follower stays in the race when
there is no patent, but then randomizes his exit decision when there is a patent (hybrid
equilibrium).
Under symmetric information, if condition (4) is satisﬁed, the leader suppresses her innova-
tion in order to keep her competitive advantage, even though she could get a higher payoﬀ from
introducing the innovation before attempting to improve upon it (if Π2 > Π12, for instance).
However, under asymmetric information and with pessimistic beliefs on behalf of the follower
(ρ<ρ ∗), the leader prefers to patent her innovation before introducing the improvement. Be-
cause this strategy induces the follower to exit the race, the leader has a monopoly position for
the exploitation of both the innovation and the improvement. In fact, the asymmetric informa-
tion restores incentives for the leader to disclose her innovation through a patent. Conversely,
this action provides no incentive for the follower to pursue the research. The patenting decision
is therefore used by the leader to trigger the exit of the follower.
This contrasts with the case of symmetric information. With more optimistic beliefs on
behalf of the follower (ρ ≥ ρ∗), he would prefer to stay in the race. In this case, there is still an
19attempt from the leader to precipitate the follower’s exit by randomizing her patenting decision.
Indeed, the leader prefers to randomize her decision in order not to reveal information to the
follower. The patenting decision no longer signals a non-improvable innovation, whereas the
non-patenting decision reveals that the innovation can be improved upon. Thus, the follower
more often decides to exit, as he is not sure of the improvability of the innovation.
We represent the new equilibria in ﬁgure 2.
Insert Figure 2
As before, we ﬁx Π2, and increase Π12. Surprisingly, at point Z the leader prefers to patent
under asymmetric information. The follower decides to exit with a probability less than 1. At
point W the leader keeps her innovation secret and the follower stays in the race, as the secret
signals an innovation that can be improved.
Hence, under asymmetric information the innovation is disclosed more often (through patent-
ing), but the patenting is, in a sense, less informative and more often induces the exit of the
follower (and thus, there is less research). The very purpose of patenting, the dissemination
of knowledge to foster future research, is changed when there is asymmetric information. This
result is consistent with the fact that ﬁrms do patent, but pretend not to rely on this type
of IPRs to appropriate the return from their innovation. We summarize these ﬁndings in the
following corollary:
Corollary 1 For a given Π2, the patenting decision is locally non-monotonic as Π12 increases,
and the exit decision is also locally non-monotonic.
5C o m p a r a t i v e S t a t i c s
We now perform some comparative static analyses. We investigate how the equilibria vary after
an increase in some of the key parameters of the model. We look at the impact of a change in
the probability of winning, the date at which the discovery is made, and the discount rate.
If we start from a low p1, holding all the other variables constant (with t2 <t 1 and p2 large
20enough), we are in a situation represented by ﬁgure 3.
Insert Figure 3
As p1 increases, the whole graph moves towards the right and the downward functions become
steeper. As p1 increases the downward functions start to slope upwards, as is the case in ﬁgure
1( o rﬁgure 2). Therefore, as p1 increases, the area where the leader keeps the innovation secret
shrinks, and the area where she patents expands. Note, however, that the lower bounds of Π2
and Π12 m a ya l s om o v ea f t e rac h a n g ei np1. Indeed, the lower limit for Π2 is increasing with
p1, as can the lower limit for Π12.F o rag i v e nΠ12 low enough, as the probability of making ﬁrst
the discovery (the improvement) increases, the leader more often patents and does not need to
keep her advantage of being the leader. On the contrary, if p1 is small, the leader is better oﬀ
keeping her advantage and, thus, more often suppressing her innovation.
If δ1 increases after an increase in the time to make the ﬁrst discovery (innovation or im-
provement), the patenting area shrinks, as does the strategic patenting decision. Therefore, as
catch up takes more time, the leader more often prefers to keep her innovation secret.
On the contrary, if r increases, the patenting decision area expands, as the leader puts more
weight on the present than on the future. We summarize these ﬁndings in the following corollary:
Corollary 2 Holding everything else constant,
• increasing the probability of winning for the leader induces her to patent more often;
• increasing the date on which the ﬁrst discovery will occur induces the leader to patent
(strategically or not) less often;
• increasing the discounting factor induces the leader to patent more.
In a more complex model of a patent race, the investments in R&D (here represented by
the same ﬁxed investment c for each ﬁrm) have an impact both on the probability of discovery
and the date on which the discovery is made. If the discovery process is a Poisson process, as
is assumed in most of patent race literature, the expected date of discovery for ﬁrm A becomes
EτA =1 /λ(cA), where τA i st h er a n d o md a t eo fd i s c o v e r yo ft h ei m p r o v e m e n t ,cA the investment
made by ﬁrm A,a n dλ(cA) is the instantaneous probability of discovering the innovation that is
21an increasing function of the investment. Therefore, the random date of discovery for either ﬁrm
is τ =m i n {τA,τB},w h e r eτB is the random date of discovery for ﬁrm B, and the expected date
of discovery (t1 in our simpliﬁed model) is Eτ =1 /(λ(cA)+λ(cB)),w h e r ecB is the investment
of ﬁrm B. We can also determine E(1 − δ1)=Ee−rτ =( λ(cA)+λ(cB))/(λ(cA)+λ(cB)+r),
E(δ1)=1− Ee−rτ = r/(λ(cA)+λ(cB)+r) and the probability of discovering the innovation
p1 = λ(cA)/(λ(cA)+λ(cB)).
By increasing her intensity of research, ﬁrm A reduces the length of the period during which
she will do research for the improvement (because E(δ1) is decreasing with cA), and at the
same time, increases her own chances of winning (p1) . B u ta tt h es a m et i m e ,ﬁrm B is likely
to increase his investment; this has the opposite eﬀect on ﬁrm A’s probability of winning (p1
decreases with cB) as well as decreasing the length of time during which both ﬁrms do research
(because E(δ1) is also decreasing with cB). In fact, in the case of a more complex model of a
race, it is impossible to hold everything else constant while looking at the eﬀect of the change
of one variable on the decision to patent and the decision to stay. Indeed, if ﬁrm A increases
her investment, ﬁrm B increases his too (in this case the investments are endogenous choices),
and this will impact the probability of winning, as well as the date on which the discovery will
occur.
However, an increase in the discount factor has no impact on the probability of being the ﬁrst
to make a discovery, but increases the expected date on which it will occur. There are two eﬀects:
ad i r e c te ﬀect and an indirect eﬀect. The direct eﬀect of an increase in the discount factor induces
more patenting, whereas the indirect eﬀect (through the expected date of discovery) induces less
patenting. Therefore, it is not clear which eﬀect dominates. Thus, in the case of a more complex
model, it is diﬃcult to reach a deﬁnitive conclusion regarding these comparative static exercises.
However, the results we ﬁnd above, with symmetric and asymmetric information, do hold in the
more complex case.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper oﬀers an explanation of the patenting behavior of ﬁrms beyond a simple cost-beneﬁt
approach. An innovator who has made a discovery must choose the most appropriate patenting
22date. Without any competition, she compares the discounted payoﬀ from holding a patent if
she patents her innovation immediately and the discounted payoﬀ from holding a patent if she
waits and patents it later. However, when competition is introduced, the leader (ﬁrst innovator)
more frequently decides to keep her innovation secret in order to keep her competitive advantage
of being ahead in the race, even though the waiting decision entails risk. Indeed, if her rival
catches up with her, he can patent or, at least, exploit the innovation instead of her. This is
true as long as ﬁrms share the same information on whether the innovation can be improved.
When the leader has more information concerning the improvability of the innovation, she can
patent strategically, and thus she patents more frequently as she adopts a random behavior. This
random patenting behavior makes her unpredictable, and her rival cannot gain any information
from observing her decision, and will also randomly choose his action. Therefore, a patent that
is supposed to signal an innovation that cannot be improved will sometimes be interpreted as
a decoy, and the competitor will stay in the race, and thus be sent to an unproﬁtable ﬁeld of
research.
In a simpliﬁed model of race, we show that in the case of symmetric information, ﬁrms
patent less frequently and stay in the race more often. This stimulates research but does not
stimulate the disclosure of information through a patent. However, when the leader has more
information than the follower concerning the improvability of the innovation, she may decide
to patent strategically, in order to mislead her rival. Therefore, interestingly, in the case of
asymmetric information, the leader will patent more frequently than in the case of symmetric
information, whereas the follower will not pursue the research as often as previously. Thus, this
stimulates the disclosure but not research.
In non-strategic models, research and disclosure tend to move together (if patents become
longer, for instance). Our model predicts that in environments that are more asymmetric,
we would expect to see increased disclosure (patenting), but possibly less follow-on research by
competitors. This suggests that, for a policy change that increases the asymmetry in information,
we might expect more patenting but no more (and possibly less) research. This is also argued by
Hall and Ham-Ziedonis (2001) in the semi-conductor industry, but for a diﬀerent reason: ﬁrms
may use patents for strategic reasons as bargaining chips to avoid court cases.
23We have adopted a highly simpliﬁed model of a race. Indeed, as brieﬂy mentioned in Sections
2 and 5, a more complex model of a patent race with the Poisson process of discovery would
capture the two features not included in this model: the fact that there is uncertainty on the
discovery date and on the identity of the winner, and that by choosing an intensity of research
each ﬁrm can inﬂuence these two variables. The optimal choice of the intensity of research by
each ﬁrm would have an impact both on the date of discovery and the probability of winning.
The introduction of this new decision variable complicates the model without really changing
the ﬂavor of the results. The timing could be: ﬁrst, ﬁrms make their decisions (exactly like in
the previous setting, sequentially) and second, depending on what they have ﬁrst decided, they
simultaneously choose their research intensities. According to Grossman and Shapiro (1986,
1987), the intensity of research varies according to the position of the ﬁrms in the race. For
instance, the leader intensiﬁes her research when she is in competition with the follower, as
opposed to the case where she is by herself in the race. Concerning the decision to patent and
the decision to exit, the outcomes of the game are not very diﬀerent from what we ﬁnd in a
much simpler setting.
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Figure 3: Patenting decision under asymmetric information, with p1 small enough
Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
The ﬁrms participate in the race if their payoﬀs are non-negative. When Ω = h,a n d
if dA(h)=p, V A
p > 0 if Π2 >δ 1(c − Π1)/p1(1 − δ1) and this implies that V m
p > 0.T h e
follower chooses dB(p)=stay if V B
p > 0 which is equivalent to having Π2 >Kwhere K =
(δ1c + rF)/(1 − p1)(1 − δ1).I f dA(h)=s, Π12 >δ 1c/p1(1 − δ1) insures that she stays and it
implies that V m
s > 0.I fﬁrm B catches up with ﬁrm A, and patents the innovation (dB/s = p),
V A
2 > 0 if Π2 > (δ2 − δ1)c/p2(1 − δ2) or Π12 > (δ2 − δ1)c/p2(1 − δ2),a n dV B
2 > 0 if Π2 >
(δ2 − δ1)(c − Π1)/(1 − p2)(1 − δ2) or Π12 > (δ2 − δ1)c/(1 − p2)(1 − δ2). As we assume that
p2 > 1/2, the last condition on Π12 implies Π12 > (δ2 − δ1)c/p2(1 − δ2).
When Ω = l and if dA(l)=s, Π1 >δ 1c/(1 − δ1)p1 insures that ﬁrm A stays. Hence, it
implies that RA
p > 0,a sw e l la sRm
s > 0 and Rm
p > 0.I fﬁrm B catches up with ﬁrm A, RB
2 > 0
if Π1 > (δ2 − δ1)c/(1 − δ2)(1 − p2) and it implies that RA
2 > 0. And because the ﬁxed cost F is
large enough, RB
p < 0 for Π1 <K . These conditions are summarized in Lemma 1.
28Symmetric information Case
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 : Improvable innovation (Ω = h)
If ﬁrm B discovers the innovation when dA(h)=s,h ec h o o s e sdB/s = s if Π2 < Π12 − (δ2 −
δ1)Π1/(1 − δ2)(1 − p2) as long as ﬁrm A does not patent it afterwards. She will not patent
it if Π2 < Π12 − (δ2 − δ1)Π1/p2(1 − δ2).I f p2 > 1/2 (respectively p2 < 1/2), then as long as
Π2 < Π12 −(δ2 −δ1)Π1/p2(1−δ2) (respectively Π2 < Π12 −(δ2 −δ1)Π1/(1−δ2)(1−p2)), none
of the ﬁrm will patent after having discovered the innovation. This gives equation (3). The rest
of the proof in given in the text above Proposition 1.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :Non-improvable innovation (Ω = l)
When dA(l)=p, ﬁrm B is better oﬀ by exiting the race as RB
p < 0. On the other hand, if
dA(l)=s, ﬁrm B chooses dB(s)=stay as RB
s > 0.F i r mA makes her decision according to the
best response function of ﬁrm B.T h e r e f o r e ﬁrm A gets a higher payoﬀ from patenting. The
Nash Perfect equilibrium is such that ﬁrm A patents and ﬁrm B exits the race.
Figures 1 and 3
First, we deﬁne the lower boundaries of the functions. For low values of Π12 (Π12 < Π1)
and Π2 (Π2 <K ), ﬁrms do not invest in the race. We then represent the diﬀerent areas that
represent the equilibrium. As p2 > 1/2, the leader never patents the innovation after having
been caught up by the follower if he has not patented the innovation.19 The inequality (3)
becomes Π2 < Π12 −(δ2 −δ1)Π1/(1−δ2)p2.W er e p r e s e n tt h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo ft h i si n e q u a l i t y
in ﬁgure 1 (and ﬁgures 2 and 3 as well) that we call (3) as well.
(i) If this inequality is not satisﬁed (thus on the left of the function (3) in the ﬁgures), ﬁrm B
prefers to patent the innovation if he catches up with ﬁrm A (dB/s = p). In this case, ﬁrm A’s
decision is dA(h)=s if (4) is satisﬁed, where V A
2 takes the value deﬁned in (1). Therefore, the
inequality (4) becomes Π2[(1−δ1)p1−(1−p1)p2(1−δ2)] < (1−δ1)p1Π12−(1−p1)c(δ2−δ1)−δ1Π1.
The sign of φ =[ ( 1− δ1)p1 − (1 − p1)p2(1 − δ2)] determines whether the function is downward
or upward sloping.
19The case where p2 < 1/2 is treated in a similar manner except that the leader can decide to patent her
innovation once she has been caught up. This can be interpreted as a delay strategy for the leader. We do not
consider in detail this case because the range of values for which the leader may delay her patenting decision is
very small and has only a negligible role.
29(a) If φ>0, the inequality (4) becomes Π2 < [(1 − δ1)p1Π12 − (1 − p1)c(δ2 − δ1) − Π1]/φ and
the right side is represented by the line on the left of the function (3) in ﬁgure 1. This arises
if p1 > 1/2 (i.e., if p1 is large enough). Indeed, because (1 − δ1) > (1 − δ2) is always true (as
t2 >t 1), (1 − δ1) >
1−p1
p1 p2(1 − δ2) is always satisﬁed if p2 <
p1
1−p1 which is true if p1 > 1/2.
(b) On the contrary if φ<0, the inequality (4) becomes Π2 > [(1 − δ1)p1Π12 − (1 − p1)c(δ2 −
δ1) − Π1]/φ and is represented on the left area in ﬁgure 3. This last case arises if p1 is small
enough. Indeed, a necessary condition to have (1 − δ1) <
1−p1
p1 p2(1 − δ2) is that p1 < 1/3.W e
have thus deﬁned in ﬁgures 1 and 3 the areas where the leader patents or keep her innovation
secret when ﬁrm B patents if he catches up with ﬁrm A.
(ii) If the inequality (3) is satisﬁed (in the right part of the three graphs), the inequality (4)
evaluated at (1) becomes Π2 < [((1 − δ1)p1 +( 1− p1)p2(1 − δ2))Π12 − (1 − p1)c(δ2 − δ1) −
δ1Π1]/(1 − δ1)p1 and is represented in the right of (3) in the three graphs.
Asymmetric information: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
There are two states of Nature, Ω = {l,h}. Firm B has only prior beliefs concerning these
states of Nature: with probability ρ he believes the innovation can be improved upon.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
We determine the separating equilibrium in which the leader patents her innovation when
it cannot be improved (dA(l)=p) and keeps it secret otherwise ( dA(h)=s). In this case, ﬁrm
B updates his beliefs, and can perfectly infer the improvability of the innovation after observing
the decision made by ﬁrm A. After observing a patent, he exits the race as Pr[l/patent]=1 .
Therefore he exits after observing a patent, and stays in the race otherwise. The leader will
deviate (from the equilibrium path) if V A
s <Vm
p and V A
s <VA
p . The last inequality does not
hold if (4) is satisﬁed, and as long as (5) is satisﬁed, the former inequality does not hold either.
Thus the leader does not deviate and this is an equilibrium. No other separating equilibrium
exists.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
We then determine the pooling equilibrium when ﬁrm A decides to patent her innovation
whatever its improvability. Firm B cannot infer any information from the observation of a
patent, and his posterior beliefs are equal to his prior beliefs, Pr[l/p]=
1−ρ
ρ+(1−ρ) =1− ρ.H e
30prefers to abandon the race as long as ρV B
p +(1−ρ)RB
p < 0 or in other terms as long as ρ<ρ ∗
where ρ∗ is deﬁned by equation (6). We also need to deﬁne what is the strategy of the follower
oﬀ the equilibrium path. Whatever the improvability of the innovation, if the leader keeps her
innovation secret, the follower always stays in the race. Therefore, the leader will not deviate
if V A
s <Vm
p for values of ρ such that ρ<ρ ∗.F u r t h e r m o r e V A
s <V m
p is equivalent tono (5).
Thus, formally the pooling equilibrium is deﬁned by (i) the strategy of the leader for each
type of innovation: (dA(h)=p, dA(l)=p); (ii) the strategy of the follower when he observes
the leader’s strategy (dB(p)=exit, dB(s)=stay); (iii) the follower’s belief is the prior belief ρ
that must be smaller than ρ∗;a n d(iv) for any out-of-equilibrium belief Pr[h/s] ∈ [0,1].
So long as inequality (4) is satisﬁed, there is no other equilibrium in pure strategies. If this
inequality (4) does not hold anymore, the only equilibrium that exists is a pooling equilibrium
in which the leader always patents, and the follower stays or exits according to his prior beliefs.
We have deﬁned equilibria in pure strategies. However, it also exist equilibria in mixed
strategies as long as inequality (4) is satisﬁed. We deﬁne an equilibrium in which the leader
always patents the non-improvable innovation whereas she randomizes her patenting decision
of the improvable innovation. She patents with probability q1 and keeps it secret with the
complementary probability (1 − q1). If the follower does not observe a patent, it is because
the innovation can be improved and then he stays in the race. If he observes a patent, he
does not know whether the innovation can be improved or not. When Ω = h the leader is
indiﬀerent between patenting it or not. There exists a probability η = Pr[stay/p] such that
ηV A
p +( 1− η)V m
p = V A
s ⇒ η =( V A
s − V m
p )/(V A
p − V m
p ) where η<1 and η>0 if V A
s <Vm
p
(condition non (5)). If dB(p)=stay, the follower’s payoﬀ is µ(h/p)V B
p +( 1− µ(h/p))RB
p and




















p .T h i si ss a t i s ﬁed for
ρ ≥ ρ∗.
The leader’s choice to randomize her patenting decision when Ω = l cannot be an equilibrium.
It is because she prefers to always patent in this case, and cannot be indiﬀerent between patenting
and not.
31Figures 2 and 3
(i) In ﬁgure 2, we represent the outcomes under asymmetric information on top of those under
symmetric information derived in ﬁgure 1. In the left side of the graph (which corresponds to the
case where dB/s = p) things remain unchanged when p1 > 1/2 (ﬁgure 2). In fact the right-hand
side of the inequality (5) evaluated at the equilibrium value of V A
2 does not appear in this part
of the graph. On the contrary, in the right side of the graph, we can represent function (5) that
is the right-hand side of inequality (5): Π2 < [((1−δ1)p1+(1−p1)p2(1−δ2))Π12−(1−p1)(δ2−
δ1)c − δ1Π1]/(1 − δ1)p1. This new equation is less steep than (4), and is on the right of (3).
(ii) Consider ﬁgure 3, when p1 is small enough. In the left part of the graph, in the area where
dB/s = p, inequality (5) is represented by a downward function that lies above (4). It is the same
in the right part of the ﬁgure, where the new inequality (5) lies above (4). Overall, it means
that the area where the leader patents her innovation expends. Therefore, under asymmetric
information, the leader patents more often. This in turn aﬀects the decision of the follower to
stay in the race. With a certain probability he will prefer to exit the race.
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